Kim takes Chalmers-style zombies to be conceptually untenable, writing that
Zombies are indistinguishable from us in their speech behavior, and we must regard them as genuine language users. Among the assertions they make are “My elbow hurts,” “This mosquito bite is really itchy,” and the like; they make phenomenal assertions of the sort we make, and do so under similar conditions. Moreover, their phenomenal assertions are not easily isolated; they are integrated smoothly and seamlessly with other parts of their discourse. To hold onto the zombie hypothesis, we must apply a massive “error theory” to these creatures—namely that all their (positive) phenomenal assertions are false. I believe that this is incoherent. We must grant that the creatures have inner consciousness, although the qualitative character of their consciousness remains undetermined.
However, he accepts the plausibility of qualia inversion, leaving us with an epiphenomenalist view in which qualia are irreducible but all other mental states are functionally reducible.
Kim takes Chalmers-style zombies to be conceptually untenable, writing that
However, he accepts the plausibility of qualia inversion, leaving us with an epiphenomenalist view in which qualia are irreducible but all other mental states are functionally reducible.